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Restorative Justice (“RJ”) is a rapidly growing field of study
and practice that cuts across disciplines, from criminal law and
criminology to education and social work. It has become a catchall
term which may describe a theory of justice, particular practices or
outcomes, the mobilization of restorative practices in a particular
place,1 or a social movement seeking to transform the way society
conceives of justice.2 There are programs springing up in schools,
workplaces, courtrooms, and prisons.3 States have passed
legislation to incorporate restorative practices into various points
in the criminal system.4 There are trainings, conferences, institutes
1 Some practitioners understand RJ as a model which exists wholly within the
criminal justice system, while the application of RJ practices outside of the courtroom
is labeled Transformative Justice. This article does not make such a distinction in
terminology, but seeks to analyze the effects of state power on court- and community-
based RJ programs.
2 CHRIS CUNNEEN & CAROLYN HOYLE, DEBATING RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 102 (2010)
(“Restorative justice can be defined in a number of ways—as a process, for instance,
or as a set of values or goals, or more broadly as a social movement seeking specific
change in the way criminal justice systems operate.”).
3 See, e.g., TREVOR FRONIUS ET AL., WESTED JUSTICE & PREVENTION RESEARCH CTR.,
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN U.S. SCHOOLS: A RESEARCH REVIEW (2016), http://jprc.wested
.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/RJ_Literature-Review_20160217.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/Z3WY-WZK3] (RJ in schools); AM. BAR ASS’N, MEDIATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS:
SURVEY OF ADR AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE PROGRAMS (2009), http://www.americanbar
.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminaljustice/mediationsurvey.authcheck
dam.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2QG-5KGB] (RJ programs in criminal justice matters);
NYC Programs and Institutions Implementing and/or Promoting Restorative Practices,
RESTORATIVE JUST. INITIATIVE, http://www.restorativejustice.nyc/restorative-justice-
nyc/ [https://perma.cc/Q2H2-3CSX] (detailing programs in the New York City area
which implement RJ in a variety of contexts); Restorative Justice, IOWA DEP’T
CORRECTIONS, https://doc.iowa.gov/victim-services/restorative-justice [https://per
ma.cc/53EY-H2BP] (RJ in prisons); Restorative Justice, MO. DEP’T CORRECTIONS, http:/
/doc.mo.gov/OD/DD/RJ.php [https://perma.cc/XY4F-PYM5] (RJ in prisons);
Restorative Justice, MONT. DEP’T CORRECTIONS, https://cor.mt.gov/Victims/Restorative
[https://perma.cc/T4AH-B68V] (RJ in prisons); Restorative Justice, VT. DEP’T
CORRECTIONS, http://doc.vermont.gov/justice/restorative-justice [https://perma.cc/
UF99-GT7A] (RJ in prisons).
4 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-303(11)(g) (2016); FLA. STAT. § 985.155
(2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 353H-31 (2013); MINN. STAT. § 611A.775 (1998), MINN.
STAT. § 609.092 (2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 2a (2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§§ 1962-1967 (2015).
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and academic journals devoted to RJ.5 Program models are being
exported across the nation and the globe.6 Large sources of
funding are being offered to develop restorative programming
both domestically and internationally.7 The ABA has a committee
addressing RJ and a UN working group has issued guidelines for
best practices.8
The growth of RJ has been fueled by different motivations
both inside and outside of the courtroom. While these motivations
have shaped the current landscape of RJ, this article provides an
analytical framework to evaluate the impact of restorative justice
programs regardless of the intentions guiding them. This
framework considers three models of RJ based on their
relationship with State power, as manifested by the criminal justice
system (“CJS”). At one end of the spectrum are court-based RJ
5 See, e.g., Center for Restorative Justice and Peacemaking, U. MINN., http://www
.cehd.umn.edu/ssw/rjp/ [https://perma.cc/B46F-2ZCM] (offering RJ trainings);
Training Center, N.Y. PEACE INST., http://nypeace.org/trainings/ [https://perma.cc/
4TG9-UD6H] (offering RJ trainings); INT’L INST. FOR RESTORATIVE PRACTICES, http://
www.iirp.edu/ [https://perma.cc/3LUD-UXH8] (offering RJ trainings); Contemporary
Justice Review, TAYLOR & FRANCIS ONLINE, http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/gcjr20/
current [https://perma.cc/FF7C-NADU] (journal devoted to RJ); Restorative Justice:
An International Journal, TAYLOR & FRANCIS ONLINE, http://www.tandfonline.com/
toc/rrej20/current [https://perma.cc/TF4R-C2LA] (journal devoted to RJ); 6th
National Conference on Community and Restorative Justice, NAT’L ASS’N COMMUNITY &
RESTORATIVE JUST., http://nacrj.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&
id=87&Itemid=715 [https://perma.cc/ZT5U-383S] (holding annual conferences);
3rd International Symposium on Restorative Justice, RESTORATIVE JUST. FOR ALL, http://
www.rj4all.info/content/RJsymposium2016 [https://perma.cc/XFL4-TBZ7]
(promoting RJ Conference). The Department of Justice has also adopted various RJ
practices under both the auspices of Community Oriented Policing Services and the
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. See, e.g., CAROLINE G. NICHOLL,
OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TOOLBOX FOR
IMPLEMENTING RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND ADVANCING COMMUNITY POLICING (1999),
http://restorativejustice.org/am-site/media/toolbox-for-implementing-restorative-
justice-and-advancing-community-policing.pdf [https://perma.cc/95CH-3NMQ]; KAY
PRANIS ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, GUIDE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE BALANCED & RESTORATIVE JUSTICE MODEL
(1998), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/167887.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZTS9-8EGY].
6 See, e.g., U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, HANDBOOK ON RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
PROGRAMMES, U.N. Sales No. E.06.V.15 (2006), https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal
_justice/06-56290_Ebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/DK9U-4ZEW]; CTR. FOR JUST. &
RECONCILIATION, http://restorativejustice.org/ [https://perma.cc/K867-48R3].
7 See, e.g., JUSTICE CTR., COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, FEDERAL FUNDING
OPPORTUNITIES TO SUPPORT SCHOOL DISCIPLINE, CLIMATE AND SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS
(2014), https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/FederalGrantPro
gramsChart.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5AU-MFBG].
8 Criminal Justice Section: Alternative Dispute Resolution and Restorative Justice
Committee, AM. B. ASS’N (Sept. 26, 2016), http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/commit
tee.cfm?com=CR100000 [https://perma.cc/S637-74LV]; U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS &
CRIME, supra note 6.
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programs, which are fully embedded within the CJS. At the other
end of the spectrum is a wholly independent community-based
model of RJ. A hybrid quasi-court model of RJ describes programs
that intersect with the CJS, but are not fully contained by it.
This article examines the current landscape of restorative
justice programs, compares their philosophical foundations, and
offers a structure for analysis. Section I presents the landscapes of
RJ and the CJS. Section II evaluates the court-based model of RJ.
Section III considers the quasi-court-based model for RJ. Section IV
discusses the independent community-based model of RJ.
Considered under this framework, establishing RJ practices within
the CJS cannot transform the overarching criminal system. Rather,
in the court-based model, the values of restorative justice are co-
opted and used to expand the power of the State. However, as a
free-standing, community-based model, restorative justice has the
potential to flourish as an alternative pathway to justice.
I. LANDSCAPES OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. Restorative Justice
“Circles move like waves and function as prisms which make spec-
trums visible. Lines clear-cut, divide, conquer. Circles meander and
move in response to the terrain shaped by voices that generate
unique contours and infinite variation. Lines are limited to agen-
das harboring specific meaning and interpretation. Circles gener-
ate meaning as a conduit for open interpretation. A line is a means
to an end. Circles are ends in themselves. They ripple out, rather
than cut through.”
—John Delk9
1. What is Restorative Justice?
Restorative Justice means many different things to different
people. Indeed, “turning to the restorative justice movement for
clarity can be disheartening because we discover that there exist
nearly as many definitions of restorative justice as there are people
offering them.”10 In our view, RJ is a mechanism for communities
to come together around an issue in a way that allows emergent
wisdom to surface and to guide decision-making. It is based on the
9 THE RESTORATIVE CTR., THE NEWBURGH MODEL OF COMMUNITY CIRCLES: ESSAYS
AND WORKBOOK 9 (2d ed. 2015).
10 DENNIS SULLIVAN & LARRY TIFFT, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: HEALING THE FOUNDA-
TIONS OF OUR EVERYDAY LIVES 32 (2001).
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values of shared power, voluntary participation, and equal voice.
Though there are a range of practices broadly categorized as RJ, we
understand RJ as a circle-based process, which is able to fully mani-
fest these values.11 The circle process is a facilitation model where
participants gather in a circle and speak, one at a time, going re-
peatedly around the circle. A circle is a way to hold space for peo-
ple to come together “as equals to have honest exchanges about
difficult issues and painful experiences in an atmosphere of respect
and concern for everyone.”12 Circles may be used to address con-
flict, but also for celebration, support, and community building.
As circles frequently require participants to honestly discuss
serious and challenging issues, participation in a circle must be vol-
untary. A facilitator, or circle keeper, may guide the dialogue
through the use of a talking piece, which represents the power
sharing within the circle. The circle keeper does not have an
agenda in resolving the matter in any particular way.13 When some-
one has the talking piece, they may speak at length without inter-
ruption, hold silence, or pass the talking piece without speaking.
Each person has the opportunity to speak. A circle thus creates a
space for people to share freely and listen deeply. This process al-
lows the emergent wisdom of the participants to surface. A circle is
“a container strong enough to hold: anger[,] frustration[,] joy[,]
pain[,] truth[,] conflict[,] diverse worldviews[,] intense feelings[,]
silence[,] paradox.”14
2. Other Practices Often Categorized as Restorative Justice
In addition to circles, a range of other practices have been
categorized under the RJ umbrella. While some define RJ broadly
to include the practices of victim-offender15 mediation (“VOM”)16
11 It is important to note that not all discussions that take place in circles are re-
storative justice. Group therapy, for instance, may follow this format, but it is focused
on behavioral modification of participants and not about building awareness of the
community.
12 KAY PRANIS, THE LITTLE BOOK OF CIRCLE PROCESSES: A NEW/OLD APPROACH TO
PEACEMAKING 6 (2005).
13 This process is distinguished from an elder circle, where particular individuals
facilitate the conversation and are expected to disseminate their wisdom among the
group.
14 PRANIS, supra note 12, at 9.
15 The terms “victim” and “offender” are used in this piece to the extent that they
are used in CJS and some restorative practices. Though far from unproblematic, these
terms are used when necessary to provide clarity about the various models. A further
critique of how these terms have been used in restorative practices is articulated in
section II.B.3, below.
16 Here, VOM is used as a catchall to encompass programs labeled Victim-Of-
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and reparative boards, these fall outside the circle-based definition
used here.
VOM is often heralded as the origin of the court-based RJ
model and VOM programs have been widely adopted across the
country.17 This practice was influenced by the victim’s rights move-
ment and Mennonite beliefs about the moral benefits of apology
and forgiveness.18 However, we see a fundamental difference in the
process of mediation and do not consider mediation-based models
to be Restorative Justice. Though some advocates of VOM seek to
distance themselves from mediation and to situate themselves fully
in the RJ camp, others accept the mantle of mediation and the
additional confidentiality protections that it may afford.19 Like
traditional mediation, VOM programs are designed to bring about
facilitated resolution of conflict by finding a middle ground that
both sides can agree to.20 In contrast, RJ is a model of shared jus-
tice that goes beyond the directly impacted individuals to other in-
terested parties and community members. In the authors’ view, RJ
attempts to get to the deepest reservoir of connection among peo-
ple in a circle to create the conditions for emergent wisdom to
arise. While mediation seeks to resolve conflicts, RJ seeks a deeper
engagement with the philosophical underpinnings of conflict—
humans’ lack of empathy and understanding of another’s point of
view.
Community boards21 likewise fall outside this definition of RJ.
In this model, a panel of community volunteers meets with an of-
fender diverted from the CJS to determine the conditions of the
diversionary program or probation. Though codified by Vermont
statute as “restorative justice,”22 these Boards do not reflect the
fender Reconciliation Programs (VORP), Victim-Offender Dialogue (VOD), and Vic-
tim-Offender Conferencing (VOC).
17 Mary Ellen Reimund, The Law and Restorative Justice: Friend or Foe? A Systematic
Look at the Legal Issues in Restorative Justice, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 667, 673 (2005).
18 See, e.g., Howard Zehr, Changing Lenses: Restorative Justice for Our Times 129-
57, 159-66 (4th ed. 2015).
19 See generally Mary Ellen Reimund, Confidentiality in Victim Offender Mediation: A
False Promise?, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 401, 405; UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 8 (NAT’L CONFER-
ENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2003), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/
docs/mediation/uma_final_03.pdf [https://perma.cc/RA4D-X3XC].
20 HOWARD ZEHR WITH ALI GOHAR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 51,
60 (2003); MARK S. UMBREIT & JEAN GREENWOOD, CTR. FOR RESTORATIVE JUSTICE &
PEACEMAKING, GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM-SENSITIVE VICTIM-OFFENDER MEDIATION: RESTOR-
ATIVE JUSTICE THROUGH DIALOGUE 1 (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/re-
ports/96517-gdlines_victims-sens/ncj176346.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GF7-NXDW].
21 These are also sometimes termed reparative or restorative boards, restorative
panels, or reparative probation.
22 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 1961-1967 (2015).
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goals of shared power and equal voice. Though they may achieve a
non-retributive outcome (e.g. no criminal record, no prison time),
these Boards rely on a hierarchal power dynamic and act as a sort
of community-based lay court to impose sanctions like community
service, victim restitution, or additional programming
requirements.23
B. The Criminal Justice System
1. Constitutional Foundations and Purpose of the Criminal
Justice System
At best, the American criminal justice system is the unfolding
of modulated State power to fairly address accusations of unlawful
behavior against members of the populace.24 By function, there are
only two powers in the CJS—the State and the accused. All shifts or
exchanges in criminal justice dynamics are thus a recalibration of
these two powers.25 In this two-power system, loss of power of the
accused is reflected by a corresponding gain in the power of the
State and vice versa. The parties in the adversarial system are repre-
sented by professionals, who navigate the complex legal and ad-
ministrative systems and argue for their side to prevail with the
judge acting as referee.26 By design, there are limited opportunities
for impacted people to speak on their own behalf.
In criminal proceedings, the State has a monopoly on the
23 Indeed, this program developed as a result of a poll circulated by the Vermont
Department of Corrections, which indicated a desire for more community control
over the criminal court process. See Susan M. Olson & Albert W. Dzur, Reconstructing
Professional Roles in Restorative Justice Programs, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 57, 65-66 (2003).
24 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“The right of one charged
with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in
some countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our state and national
constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safe-
guards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defen-
dant stands equal before the law.”); see also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490
(1964) (“[N]o system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to depend
for its continued effectiveness on the citizens’ abdication through unawareness of
their constitutional rights. No system worth preserving should have to fear that if an
accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise,
these rights. If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a
system of law enforcement, then there is something very wrong with that system.”
(footnote omitted)).
25 See generally Brooke D. Coleman, Prison Is Prison, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2399,
2400 (2013) (exploring the impact of the Supreme Court’s differing views of state
power in the criminal and civil contexts as they impact the right to counsel).
26 Mary Sue Backus, The Adversary System Is Dead; Long Live the Adversary System: The
Trial Judge As the Great Equalizer in Criminal Trials, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 945, 945-47
(2008).
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power to charge people with crimes.27 Concerned about the poten-
tial for tyrannical abuse of state power, the writers of the Constitu-
tion enshrined a series of powerful protections for the accused
when the State exercises its police and prosecutorial powers.28 The
first protection in the adversarial system is the codification of the
presumption of innocence.29 The State must prove its case in a
public forum, with evidence untainted by unlawful searches or
seizures and with testimony from witnesses who are sworn to tell
the truth.30 The accused has the right to cross-examine any wit-
nesses and present their own evidence, but the State cannot com-
pel the accused to testify or to incriminate themself. A jury of the
accused’s peers is charged with determining whether the State has
met its high burden of proving every element of the charges be-
yond a reasonable doubt.31 Only then can the State impose the
stigma and penalty of a conviction. The degree to which the State
should err on the side of innocence is emphasized by Blackstone’s
formulation that “it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than
that one innocent suffer.”32 Benjamin Franklin’s iteration of this
maxim increases this ratio by a magnitude, noting, “it is better a
hundred guilty persons should escape than one innocent person
should suffer . . . .”33
In cases where the State is able to establish guilt, whether
through plea or conviction, it has the authority to impose sanctions
on the offender. Under the theory of retribution or “just deserts,”
the moral culpability of the offender gives the State a duty to im-
pose punishment.34 Under this theory, those who have caused suf-
fering morally deserve suffering and the scales of justice are
rebalanced by meting it out.35 This exercise of state-sanctioned
punishment should be proportionate to the severity of the offense
27 The advent of modern criminal law began with the Norman Conquest of Britain
in the twelfth century. Mary Ellen Reimund, Is Restorative Justice on a Collision Course
with the Constitution?, 3 APPALACHIAN J.L. 1, 6 (2004). This transformed the view of
crime as a conflict between individuals to a breach of the king’s peace, giving the
monarch increased power over the people. John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assess-
ing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, 25 CRIME & JUST. 1, 2 (1999).
28 U.S. CONST. amends. IV-VI, VIII; id. art. III, § 2.
29 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 250 (2016).
30 U.S. CONST. amends. IV-VI, VIII.
31 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
32 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358.
33 11 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, WORKS 13 (John Bigelow ed., 1904) (letter from Benja-
min Franklin to Benjamin Vaughan dated Mar. 14, 1785).
34 THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY: COMPACT EDITION 602 (Ste-
phen Michael Sheppard ed., 2011).
35 Id.
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and the blameworthiness of the offender.36 Under the theory of
utilitarianism, punishment is justified by the useful purpose that
punishment serves such as deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilita-
tion, and restitution.37 The CJS has adopted a huge array of possi-
ble sanctions under the principles of these different theories of
punishment, which are frequently incompatible with one
another.38
2. How the Criminal Justice System Functions in Practice
Though the constitutional foundations for the CJS demand
that the State meet this high burden to impose punishment, in
practice, the carefully crafted balance of power has shifted. Today,
very few criminal cases go to trial and the vast majority are resolved
through guilty pleas.39 By forgoing the right to trial and the protec-
tions that it affords, the accused nearly always waives at least some
of the rights designed to protect them and to balance the scales
against state tyranny.40 Though the accused may validly waive some
of these rights, the reliance on pleas to resolve most cases means
that the State rarely needs to meet its high burden to prove guilt.
Rather, practices like selective policing, charge stacking, pre-trial
detention, cash bail, and the trial tax allow the State to put its
thumb on the scale and exert pressure on the accused to plead
early.41 In cases where the accused demands that the State meet
their burden, the wheels of the system turn slowly.42 Thus, when-
ever the State is able to avoid the rigors of trial, State power is
enhanced.
36 Id.; Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg & Tali Gal, Criminal Law Multitasking, 18 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 893, 912 (2014); Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg & Tali Gal, Restorative Crimi-
nal Justice, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2313, 2333 (2013).
37 Samantha Buckingham, Reducing Incarceration for Youthful Offenders with a Develop-
mental Approach to Sentencing, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801, 847 (2013).
38 CUNNEEN & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 170.
39 Sources estimate upwards of 90% of state and federal criminal cases are resolved
through guilty pleas. See, e.g., LINDSEY DEVERS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING: RESEARCH SUMMARY (2011), https://
www.bja.gov/Publications/PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7QJY-KC5R]; Benjamin Weiser, Trial by Jury, a Hallowed American Right, Is Vanishing,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/08/nyregion/jury-tri-
als-vanish-and-justice-is-served-behind-closed-doors.html [https://perma.cc/943Q-
84D9].
40 Robert Schehr, The Emperor’s New Clothes: Intellectual Dishonesty and the Unconstitu-
tionality of Plea-Bargaining, 2 TEX. A&M L. REV. 385, 393 (2015).
41 Id. at 428; Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 407 (1992).
42 See Daniel Hamburg, A Broken Clock: Fixing New York’s Speedy Trial Statute, 48
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 223, 227 (2015).
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Victims’ rights reforms of the CJS have further shifted the bal-
ance of power against the accused. The victims’ rights movement
has advanced the notion that the victim is a party to the proceed-
ing and not merely a witness43 — for example, giving the com-
plaining witness the right to speak at public hearings involving
release, plea, sentencing, and parole.44 In the balance between the
State and the accused, enhancing the role of a victim to aid in pros-
ecution increases the power of the State, which, in a two-party sys-
tem, can only come at the expense of the accused.
Unsurprisingly, this increase in State power has not been
evenly borne, but reflects societal structures of oppression and
domination. “Power has an infinite number of ways of regenerating
its strategies and justifications for its continued existence, all to
protect the status, prestige, and position of the power-wielder, the
ownership and control of the power process, and privileged access
to benefits that were and continue to be collectively-produced.”45
By turning its “gaze to select marginalized populations”, the CJS is
able to “mask the effects” of its power within overarching patterns
of oppression.46 In an imperialist, capitalist, white supremacist,
ableist, cis-hetero-patriarchy, those targeted by the State are there-
fore disproportionately poor people, people of color, Native Peo-
ples, people who are trans and gender non-conforming, and
people with mental illness.47 Through the criminalization of pov-
43 Josephine Gittler, Expanding the Role of the Victim in a Criminal Action: An Overview
of Issues and Problems, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 117, 176-78 (1984); see also Christa Obold-Eshle-
man, Note, Victims’ Rights and the Danger of Domestication of the Restorative Justice Para-
digm, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 571, 584-85 (2004). Obold-Eshleman
distinguishes that while some measures have been designed to reduce the fear and
traumatization of victims (such as confidentiality of personal information and coun-
seling records), others were intended to increase the victim’s power to assist in the
prosecution or to impose harsher penalties against the alleged offender. Id. at 584-85.
44 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4) (2015). In addition to incorporating victims’ rights pro-
visions in the federal system, every state has adopted, by legislation or constitutional
amendment, some reforms increasing victim participation in the criminal process.
Peggy M. Tobolowksy, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process: Fifteen Years After
the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINE-
MENT 21, 32-33 (1999).
45 SULLIVAN & TIFFT, supra note 10, at 134 (citation omitted).
46 Id. at 158.
47 See, e.g., BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 92 (1984); BELL
HOOKS, THE WILL TO CHANGE: MEN, MASCULINITY AND LOVE 17, 29 (2004); CAROLINE
WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEFENSE COUN-
SEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5SXY-BWQN] (showing that the majority of people accused of
crimes rely upon indigent defense services); MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, THE SEN-
TENCING PROJECT, UNEVEN JUSTICE: STATE RATES OF INCARCERATION BY RACE AND
ETHNICITY (2007), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/
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erty, the selective enforcement of crime, the militarization of the
police, and the rise of state surveillance, the State has been able to
increase its own power at the expense of those individuals who are
least able to defend themselves against it.48 The result of this has
been the explosion of the adult prison population to over two mil-
lion and nearly seven million under some form of community
supervision.49
This current crisis of mass incarceration is evidence of the CJS
trend toward increased punitiveness.50 However, the diversity of
strategies for punishment allow the State, and to a lesser extent
individual courts, to choose from a large menu of possible sanc-
tions.51 For example, in addition to sentencing individuals to im-
prisonment52 the state may impose fines, community service, or
Uneven-Justice-State-Rates-of-Incarceration-by-Race-and-Ethnicity.pdf [https://perma
.cc/4BQ5-YQPL] (on racial disparities in incarceration); LAKOTA PEOPLE’S LAW PRO-
JECT, NATIVE LIVES MATTER (2015), http://www.docs.lakotalaw.org/reports/Na-
tive%20Lives%20Matter%20PDF.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Y75-KTAM]; Jon Marcus,
Bringing Native American Stories to a National Audience, NIEMAN REP. (Feb. 11, 2016),
http://niemanreports.org/articles/bringing-native-american-stories-to-a-national-au-
dience/ [https://perma.cc/GK54-EHRD] (noting disproportionate incarceration of
Native people); FORGE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE?: NEW FAST FACTS ABOUT TRANSGENDER PEO-
PLE, POLICE, AND INCARCERATION (2011), http://forge-forward.org/wp-content/docs/
fast-facts-police1.pdf [https://perma.cc/KA79-NZY5] (statistics on the incarceration
of transgender and gender non-conforming people); SASHA ABRAMSKY & JAMIE
FELLNER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH
MENTAL ILLNESS (2003), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa1003
.pdf [https://perma.cc/HHH9-X9KJ] (on the incarceration of people with mental
illness).
48 See, e.g., Sarah Childress, The Problem with “Broken Windows” Policing, PBS.ORG:
FRONTLINE (June 28, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/the-prob-
lem-with-broken-windows-policing/ [https://perma.cc/9QTD-LBJ8]; KAREN DOLAN &
JODI L. CARR, INST. FOR POLICY STUDIES, THE POOR GET PRISON: THE ALARMING SPREAD
OF THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY (2015), http://www.ips-dc.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/03/IPS-The-Poor-Get-Prison-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4RL-
LMUF]; Dexter Filkins, “Do Not Resist” and the Crisis of Police Militarization, NEW YORKER
(May 13, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/do-not-resist-and-the-
crisis-of-police-militarization [https://perma.cc/H32X-6YEM]; Glenn Greenwald, New
Study Shows Mass Surveillance Breeds Meekness, Fear and Self-Censorship, INTERCEPT (Apr.
28, 2016, 11:03 AM), https://theintercept.com/2016/04/28/new-study-shows-mass-
surveillance-breeds-meekness-fear-and-self-censorship/ [https://perma.cc/3A6F-
XCE4].
49 LAUREN E. GLAZE & DANIELLE KAEBLE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013 1-2 (2014), www
.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus13.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FD8-6AD9] (reporting
2,220,300 people incarcerated and 6,899,000 adults under supervision).
50 Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 913 (2007).
51 CUNNEEN & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 170 (citing O’Malley).
52 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70 (McKinney 2009). Additionally, in some jurisdic-
tions, the death penalty remains an available punishment. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
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probation.53 In other cases, the accused may be offered a diversion-
ary program, where in exchange for a guilty plea and successful
completion of the program, the charges are dismissed.54 However,
if an individual does not complete the program to the satisfaction
of the court, the conviction stands and the accused faces the tradi-
tional penalty of incarceration.55 Diversionary programs often pur-
port to be rehabilitative and seek to break cycles of crime by
providing counseling, job training, and drug treatment services,
among others.56
The presence of what are perceived to be softer options can be
used to secure “the hegemony of law by making the harsher aspects
of the criminal justice system more palatable, particularly its racial-
ised, gendered and class-based effects . . . .”57 Though programs
which are based on the principle of rehabilitation may at first
glance seem beneficial to all involved, problem-solving or treat-
ment-based approaches which are contingent upon a guilty plea
also require that the accused waive constitutional rights.58 The
treatment paradigm may give the State more power to impose pro-
gramming requirements and justify increased monitoring.59 In
FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY (2017), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/docu-
ments/FactSheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3S7-3LL9].
53 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 65, 85 (McKinney 2014).
54 Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Pretrial Diversion: Statute or Court Rule Authorizing
Suspension or Dismissal of Criminal Prosecution on Defendant’s Consent to Noncriminal Alter-
native, 4 A.L.R.4th § 2(a) (1981); Shaila Dewan & Andrew W. Lehren, After a Crime, the
Price of a Second Chance, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
12/12/us/crime-criminal-justice-reform-diversion.html [https://perma.cc/76LJ-
WV8F]. Programs labeled alternatives to incarceration (ATI) frequently fit into the
diversionary scheme when offered, not as a sentence itself, but as part of an agree-
ment to defer sentencing. RACHEL PORTER ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, BALANCING
PUNISHMENT AND TREATMENT: ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION IN NEW YORK CITY 24
(2002), http://archive.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/Balanc-
ing_ATI.pdf [https://perma.cc/XZX6-S8TL].
55 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.05 (McKinney 1992); Dewan & Lehren, supra note 54.
56 PORTER ET AL., supra note 54, at 4-5.
57 CUNNEEN & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 164.
58 Namely, the right against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the
right to confront one’s accusers. See generally Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243
(1969) (holding that a knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination, right to jury trial, and right to confront one’s accusers);
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973) (“When a criminal defendant has
solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he
is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation
of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.”). As a
condition of many plea bargains, the accused must also often waive their right to
appeal. Alexandra W. Reimelt, Note, An Unjust Bargain: Plea Bargains and Waiver of the
Right to Appeal, 51 B.C. L. REV. 871, 873 n.24 (2010).
59 Holly Catania & Joanne Csete, Drug Courts and Drug Treatment: Dismissing Science
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drug courts in particular, there are concerns that courts are “play-
ing doctor” by requiring offenders to complete programming that
may not comport with medical consensus and may even be exacer-
bating patterns of addiction.60 Though rehabilitation-based pro-
grams may provide some people with helpful tools, these programs
cannot overcome the processes of criminalization and coercion
that have corrupted the larger system.
II. COURT-BASED RJ PROGRAMS
“Only free men can negotiate. Prisoners cannot enter into
contracts.”
—Nelson Mandela61
RJ programs in the court-based model are diversionary pro-
grams, which are offered as post-plea, pre-sentence alternatives to
incarceration. In this model, the offer of RJ is used as an induce-
ment for the accused to plead guilty. Rather than face the lengthy
and uncertain result of proceeding to trial, the accused may waive
their right to make the State prove the charges against them, on
the understanding that they will receive more limited sanctions. In
this model, the court must grant permission for the accused to par-
ticipate in an RJ program. Typically, the accused must admit re-
sponsibility for the alleged conduct and may need to demonstrate
their willingness to apologize to any victims. If an agreement can-
not be reached in an RJ process, the State retains power to impose
traditional penalties. Additionally, the State may also set limits on
what falls within the range of acceptable outcomes for a restorative
encounter. These limits are usually imposed by courts to prevent
outcomes they perceive to be too lenient.62
What constitutes “successful” completion of a program varies.
It may require the victim and offender to come to a restitution
agreement or for the offender to apologize to the victim. By in-




61 Zindzi Mandela, Statement by Nelson Mandela at a UDF Rally to Celebrate
Archbishop Tutu Receiving the Nobel Peace Prize (Feb. 10, 1985), http://db.nelson
mandela.org/speeches/pub_view.asp?pg=item&ItemID=NMS013 [https://perma.cc/
2RXE-A6JE].
62 JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION 147
(2002). Braithwaite quotes Declan Roche, who noted that internal (restorative) mech-
anisms intervene to prevent outcomes that are too harsh; external (court) mecha-
nisms prevent outcomes that are too lenient.
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serting RJ within the CJS, these programs are attempting to shift
the focus from the relationship between the State and the accused
to the human relationships impacted by the crime. In this model,
the State is attempting to substitute its own version of justice with
RJ practices. For the CJS, justice is achieved when the power of the
state is held to the standard of proving the guilt of the accused,
beyond a reasonable doubt in an open forum, under sworn testi-
mony, and with a jury of their peers concluding whether the state
has met its burden. In contrast, court-based RJ programs are prima-
rily concerned with returning to the pre-crime status quo by mak-
ing parties whole, through material and/or symbolic restitution.
These programs purport to provide space “for healing” and give
impacted parties the opportunity to “put things right.”63
However, the danger with this approach is that it seeks to re-
store humanity to a system that was not designed to be human.
Because the court-based model of RJ remains embedded in the
CJS, it is fully contained within the hierarchical system of power
manifested in the CJS. These models have a direct effect on the
balance between State power and the rights of the accused. This
complex interchange often leads to the diminished rights of the
accused and the enhanced rights of the state.64 In addition to im-
plicating the rights of the accused, the court-based model co-opts
RJ to serve the needs of the CJS. In this model, access to RJ is con-
trolled and confined by the larger system it inhabits. Court-based
RJ models must accept certain realities of the CJS in order to oper-
ate within it. In this model, elements of the CJS permeate RJ,
preventing it from operating on its own terms. As this section dem-
onstrates, the good intentions propelling this model are thus in-
centivizing the displacement of the adversarial system configured
to regulate the power of the State.
A. Rights of the Accused
Those critical of the court-based model raise concerns about
the ability of these programs to adequately protect the Constitu-
tional rights of the accused.65 Proponents are quick to cite the pos-
sibilities of reduced criminal penalties, reduced recidivism, low
63 ZEHR WITH GOHAR, supra note 20, at 18, 25, 54-55.
64 Reimund, supra note 17, at 681-82.
65 See, e.g., id. at 683; Buckingham, supra note 37, at 876-77; C. Quince Hopkins,
The Devil is in the Details: Constitutional and Other Legal Challenges Facing Restorative Justice
Responses to Sexual Assault Cases, 50 CRIM. L. BULL. 478 (2014); Reimund, supra note 27.
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costs, and increased community connections as benefits.66 Substan-
tively, they argue, court-based RJ provides a more holistic model of
accountability, which meets basic human needs left unaddressed by
the traditional CJS model. Nonetheless, RJ programs “stand on
constitutionally questionable ground,” and rest on the accused’s
willingness to forgo an array of Constitutional protections.67 By
waiving these rights, the accused cedes some of their power, thus
enhancing the power of the state. Though this trade-off marks a
general trend in the operation of the CJS—all plea deals, which
resolve the vast majority of criminal cases, rely on similar waivers—
restorative justice should not be used to legitimate this broadening
of state power.
RJ programs in this model implicate the right of due process
(particularly freedom from coercion), the right against self-incrimi-
nation, the right to counsel, and confidentiality.68
1. Due Process and Coercion
One of the key concerns about restorative programs within the
criminal system is the presence of coercion, which is protected
against by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.69 The accused’s waiver of constitutional protections
must be voluntary and not coerced.70 A plea is not voluntary if in-
duced by threats, misrepresentations, or bribes.71 However, the bar
for demonstrating that a plea is involuntary is fairly high.72 Con-
cerns about coercion are particularly salient during diversions,
which take place early in the criminal process and encroach on the
66 CUNNEEN & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 25, 33-34; Braithwaite, supra note 27, at 18;
Buckingham, supra note 37, at 854-57.
67 Richard Delgado, Goodbye to Hammurabi: Analyzing the Atavistic Appeal of Restora-
tive Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 751, 760 (2000).
68 Others have raised concerns about how court-based RJ programs may limit op-
portunities to challenge evidence obtained through an unlawful search or seizure.
Cases diverted out of the system through pleas increase the risk that the State will not
be held accountable for abuses of this power.
69 See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970).
70 Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); McCarthy v. United States, 394
U.S. 459, 470-72 (1969).
71 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (“(A) plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the
direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by
the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or
promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unful-
filled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature im-
proper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g. bribes).”
(quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957))).
72 See, e.g., Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978); North Carolina v. Alford,
400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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presumption of innocence.73 Where the accused lacks information
about the likely outcome of their case, their fear can be more easily
exploited to secure cooperation in restorative programs.74 Where
RJ is offered as an alternative sentence, these concerns are less pro-
nounced, but offenders often still feel compelled to participate in
these programs when they are offered.75 When the accused is held
in state custody due to an inability to afford bail, an offer that
would allow them to get out of jail creates a strong incentive for
participation.
Most proponents of restorative practices argue that the incen-
tives to accept these programs are no greater for restorative pro-
grams than for any other diversionary program or a plea bargain.
However, unlike a program for drug-treatment or defensive driv-
ing, “successful” completion of a restorative program generally re-
quires the consensus of all of the participants.76 Though some
suggest that this requirement will ensure that only those offenders
who are “serious” about a restorative option will pursue this course,
the threat of additional penalties may encourage participants to
perform contrition or whatever the restorative program requires to
be deemed a success. Even if the inducement does not rise to the
level of coercion, these programs still raise due process concerns
because they circumvent a legal procedure that might have re-
sulted in acquittal.77
2. Right against Self-Incrimination
The right against self-incrimination is also implicated in the
court-based model. One scholar estimates that roughly half of the
RJ programs operating in the US require the accused to admit guilt
to participate in the program,78 thus waiving their right against self-
incrimination, which would otherwise be in effect through sentenc-
ing.79 If the RJ process is not successful, the case is referred back to
the CJS, and any statements that the accused made could be used
against them.80 In addition to the instant offense, it is possible that
the offender or other participants may admit to other criminal
73 Dancig-Rosenberg & Gal, Restorative Criminal Justice, supra note 36, at 2322.
74 Id.
75 Reimund, supra note 17, at 684.
76 OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, supra note 5, at 9-15
(listing various programs which require an agreement among participants).
77 Daniel W. Van Ness & Pat Nolan, Legislating for Restorative Justice, 10 REGENT U.
L. REV. 53, 78 (1998).
78 Reimund, supra note 27, at 8.
79 Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 325 (1999).
80 Landis, supra note 54.
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acts. The absence of guarantees about confidentiality means that
any information shared at an RJ process would open the door for
attorneys to question and cross-examine participants about any
such acts.81 Where RJ programs require facilitators to be mandated
reporters, certain admissions by participants would be referred to
the authorities by design.
3. Right to Counsel
The right to counsel is also implicated in many programs in
this model. The right to counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment and applies at every “critical stage” of criminal proceedings.82
Though programs which take place in the corrections context, af-
ter a prisoner has exhausted all of their legal remedies, would not
implicate this right, programs which take place at any point before
this may. Though some restorative programs allow participants’ at-
torneys to attend, others do not,83 finding their participation to be
at odds with the informal and non-adversarial nature of most re-
storative practices. Nonetheless, programs in this model deprive
the accused of the benefit of the advice of counsel that they would
have received in the CJS.
4. Confidentiality
The question of confidentiality occupies murky territory in
court-based RJ processes. There is no constitutional or statutory
guarantee to confidentiality in restorative programs.84 The ABA
tried to address this particular challenge, issuing a guideline that
“statements made by victims and offenders and documents and
other materials produced during the mediation/dialogue process
[should be] inadmissible in criminal or civil court proceedings.”85
Still, such guidelines are not binding and attorneys could later use
81 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57-59 (2004) (collecting cases where
courts have admitted testimonial hearsay into evidence despite the lack of opportu-
nity to cross-examine the out-of-court witness).
82 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
83 Tina S. Ikpa, Note, Balancing Restorative Justice Principles and Due Process Rights in
Order to Reform the Criminal Justice System, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 301, 313 (2007).
84 To the extent that RJ is a type of mediation, one avenue for protection is the
Uniform Mediation Act, which several states have adopted. Despite such protections,
mediation records may still be vulnerable to subpoena, and there are questions about
whether restorative practices can be properly classified as mediation. See Reimund,
supra note 17, at 686, 686 n.140.
85 RANDOLPH N. STONE, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES
(1994), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/1994_
am_101b.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/W368-7D8M].
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information learned in restorative processes to question and cross-
examine participants. Additionally, the use of mandated reporters
as facilitators explicitly rejects any confidentiality guarantees where
a participant makes certain admissions.
This uncertain state of confidentiality also raises concerns for
defense attorneys representing an individual who is considering
participating in a restorative process. Though the duty of confiden-
tiality is an ethical requirement and not an explicit Constitutional
guarantee,86 a breach of this duty could lead to a claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel, thereby rendering counsel’s assistance
constitutionally deficient in the criminal context.87 To retain attor-
ney-client privilege, communication between the parties must be
kept private,88 which is the source of the ubiquitous advice to the
accused to not discuss a pending case with others. Restorative prac-
tices, which depend on dialogue among the parties, are in direct
conflict with this advice.
Proponents of the court-based model have called for increased
protections for confidentiality in restorative encounters, in the
form of legislation or cooperation from prosecutors not to use
statements made during the process.89 However, no legislation can
extinguish the accused’s right to cross-examine witnesses against
them in a criminal trial, and prosecutors would be reluctant to sur-
render their access to RJ proceedings if a defense attorney could
use a diversionary restorative process to gather information, return
to the adversarial process, and use information to the benefit of
the accused. Many programs thus rely on cooperation with the
prosecutor and the court to preserve some sense of confidentiality.
Even if these promises are always honored, the unsettled matter of
confidentiality gives prosecutors broad discretion to limit when RJ
is used in the court-based model.90
B. Cooptation of Restorative Justice
In addition to concerns about the rights of the accused, the
court-based model gives the court the power to control how RJ is
utilized. This control has marginalized RJ within CJS, making it
available to a limited class of alleged offenders, and only when a
86 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
87 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984).
88 Thomas M. Geisler, Proof of Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege, 32 AM. JUR. 3D Proof
of Facts § 189 (2017).
89 Hopkins, supra note 65, § II.B.
90 Indeed, the increased confidentiality provisions in CJS proceedings involving
youth may be a factor in limiting court-based RJ programs to young offenders.
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court or prosecutor grants permission.91 This model also requires
RJ programs to accept the overarching CJS framework, though the
values of the two systems are inherently contradictory. Constrained
by the larger system, court-based RJ programs are unable to oper-
ate on their own terms and are coopted to achieve the objective of
the CJS—namely to meet its goals of crime control and restore the
negative image of the CJS itself.
Indeed, RJ programs in this model sometimes seek to empha-
size their toughness to appeal to the CJS—both in terms of the
emotional toll on the offender and increased accountability in
completing any restitution or community service agreements.92
Seeking to bridge the gap between the goals and values of the CJS
and RJ, some proponents have gone so far as to state that “restora-
tive justice is not an alternative to punishment but an alternative
form of punishment.”93 Likewise, pressures on RJ to demonstrate
that these programs meet CJS goals, such as cost-efficiency and re-
duced recidivism, may lead proponents of this model to adopt a
narrow view of how RJ programs should be deployed in order to
allow them to maintain their position within the courts.
1. Control, Marginalization, and Criminalization
Within the CJS, the state controls when and for whom restora-
tive practices may be used, keeping them marginalized within the
broader system. Despite the widespread growth of RJ as a disci-
pline,94 it maintains only a toehold in the US criminal system.95 RJ
interventions in the CJS are often limited to the “shallow end” of
criminal justice and are frequently limited to cases where: the of-
fender is a youth; the offense is a low-level (typically non-violent)
crime; and/or it is the person’s first offense.96 This sort of risk
management approach bifurcates the criminal system, separating
those who would, in the State’s view, benefit from a restorative ap-
proach and those who deserve punishment. This bifurcation allows
the State to point to the existence and benefits of court-based RJ
91 Landis, supra note 54 (“Prosecutors have long employed diversion on an infor-
mal, individual basis by deferring prosecution if, for example, the accused entered
the military or agreed to undergo rehabilitative treatment.”).
92 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 62, at 149.
93 CUNNEEN & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 44.
94 Mark S. Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice: An Empirically Grounded Movement Facing
Many Opportunities and Pitfalls, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 511, 520-21 (2007).
95 CUNNEEN & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 185.
96 Id. at 48.
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programs to restore its own image, while retaining control over
who is diverted from more punitive sanctions.
Programs in this model also implicitly accept the CJS’s process
of criminalization and serve to naturalize practices that bring an
offender to the attention of restorative programs within the
courts.97 The process of criminalization is shaped both by the types
of harms that the CJS addresses and the communities that are dis-
proportionately targeted by selective policing. Structural vio-
lence—social arrangements which allow some to thrive at the
expense of others—is not considered to be a violation of the law.98
This distinction is what allows society to view someone subject to
street violence as “worthy of our concern, empathy, and attention,”
while someone subject to structural violence is “unworthy, even of
the designation of victim.”99 Limiting the use of RJ as a state-sanc-
tioned response to certain types of harm greatly limits the potential
of RJ to address the broader context in which crime occurs. If the
goal of this model is to restore participants to the pre-crime status
quo, restoring someone to an environment of pervasive structural
violence can provide limited benefits, at best.
2. Voluntariness
Another fundamental principle of RJ is that participants ap-
pear in circle on a voluntary basis. This freedom of presence cre-
ates the bases for the actualization of one’s own power to speak
and make choices within the group. This foundational principle of
RJ cannot exist when it is vested within the CJS. No one voluntarily
becomes the accused in CJS. There is a dishonesty in claiming that
the accused voluntarily waives their constitutional rights to partici-
pate in RJ circle, when their presence in the court is due to the
state. Though the waiver of constitutional rights may not be the
result of outright coercion, most practitioners and courts know
that the result of any guilty plea is the result of many coercive, sys-
tematic pressures toward the least injurious resolution of a case.100
In the court-based model, the notion that all parties are participat-
97 Id. at 164.
98 SULLIVAN & TIFFT, supra note 10, at 157.
99 Id. at 158 (citation omitted).
100 Steven Zeidman, To Plead or Not to Plead: Effective Assistance and Client-Centered
Counseling, 39 B.C. L. REV. 841, 856-59 (1998) (discussing the coercive pressure of
defense counsel on defendants’ pleading decisions, as recognized by courts); see also
H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of the Justice Sys-
tem, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 63, 69-70 (2011).
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ing voluntarily creates an obstacle to the honest manifestation of a
circle.
3. Power-Sharing
The court-based model imposes serious limitations on the abil-
ity of RJ programs to create an experience of shared power, as the
framework of the CJS imputes significant power to the victim at the
expense of the accused. Acceptance of the CJS’s identity-fixing la-
bels of “victim” and “offender” as valid and meaningful legitimates
the state’s process for identifying and classifying people in conflict
and only serves to “separate, brand, marginalize, control, and con-
strain” the possibilities.101 Within the criminal system, these terms
establish roles which create a dichotomy where one party should
be “blamed or pitied” and the other should be “sanctioned, con-
trolled, and surveilled.”102 Even where the terms victim and of-
fender are rejected, programs in this model may adopt the roles of
“the person who has been harmed” or “the person who has
harmed.”103 While these terms do strive to re-center the humanity
of participants beyond the labels imposed by the CJS, this frame-
work still adopts the binary of the criminal courts and imputes the
power to define the harm to one party. This power is antithetical to
the value of equal voice and power sharing required by RJ. Fixing
these roles prior to an RJ encounter risks closing the door to con-
versations about past harms among participants or structural
harms that underlie the immediate dispute.
Though parties may be permitted to speak in turn, the defen-
dant is sitting in the circle with a case pending in the superseding
court system. Though they can speak freely, the defendant is the
only one facing criminal prosecution at the conclusion of the cir-
cle. If there is anything that the criminal justice system is good at, it
is to inform all of the participants of what the effects of their words
and actions within the system would be, so that all participants
quickly learn what needs to be said in front of the judge, for the
purpose of a plea, and even to their lawyers. It is hard to conceive
of a situation where a person facing a criminal conviction would
participate in an RJ circle and feel free to point out how the behav-
ior of the identified victim mitigates the defendant’s own actions or
may have even provoked the situation.104 The person with the most
101 SULLIVAN & TIFFT, supra note 10, at 80.
102 Id. at 82.
103 See, e.g., id. at 80.
104 See generally Joseph Robinson & Jennifer Hudson, Restorative Justice: A Typology
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power in the CJS circle is the victim. The person designated as a
victim is in a place of extreme protection and privilege in the
court-based model.105 Indeed, most circles within CJS will not con-
vene unless the accused has made a full admission of guilt and ex-
pressed willingness to apologize to the victim.106 In some ways, the
programs in this model are nearly as theatrical and scripted as the
roles in the CJS system. All parties are aware of what they should
say to achieve the best outcomes for themselves.
C. Conclusion
In the court-based model, RJ is, at best, a court-sanctioned di-
versionary program for certain offenders deemed worthy of a re-
storative approach. At worst, offenders may be coerced into waiving
Constitutional rights with the promise of reduced criminal penal-
ties, denying them both essential rights in the criminal arena and
the opportunity for a truly restorative process.
III. QUASI-COURT-BASED RESTORATIVE JUSTICE PROGRAMS
In this model, RJ programs do not reside within the criminal
justice system, but seek to address the ancillary fallout of the CJS
and mitigate the impact of interacting with the CJS. It is a hybrid of
the purely court-based or community-based models. The entryway
into these systems is the exit point away from the CJS. Though
these RJ models do not fall squarely within the CJS power dynamic,
due to their close proximity to and intersection with the CJS, they
often reflect the power interplay of the courts.
As hybrid models, quasi-court programs have considerable va-
riation, and the extent of the State’s influence depends on the
stage of criminal proceedings where the RJ intervention occurs.107
and Critical Appraisal, 23 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 335, 351 (2016)
(“When victims’ narratives and needs are institutionally dominant, offenders’ needs
may suffer a concomitant loss. This criticism is especially acute when offenders are
ordered or incentivized to participate in RJ. Victim-lecturing, in which the victim
harangues and verbally abuses the offender, may be more commonplace than is gen-
erally assumed and results in a negative and disempowering experience for the
offender.”).
105 Ikpa, supra note 83, at 313-15.
106 See, e.g., Raffaele Rodogno, Shame and Guilt in Restorative Justice, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 142, 156 (2008) (“[R]emember that during restorative justice conferences
the apologies of the offender to the victim are an essential part of symbolic
reparation.”).
107 See, e.g., Kate E. Bloch, Reconceptualizing Restorative Justice, HASTINGS RACE & POV-
ERTY L.J. 201, 211 (2010); GORDON BAZEMORE & MARK UMBREIT, OFFICE OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A COMPARISON OF FOUR
RESTORATIVE CONFERENCING MODELS 7 (2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
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Programs in this model include pre-charge diversions; programs
which do not require a plea of guilty, but hold the outcome of a
case in abeyance pending successful completion of an RJ program;
circles convened outside the courts to develop recommendations
for sentencing; or RJ programs operating within prisons to foster
dialogue among those impacted by crime or preparing for re-entry.
Rather than attempting to reform the CJS, programs in this model
tend to focus on harm reduction or mitigating the impact of in-
volvement with the CJS.108 These programs are often designed to
address the punitive tendencies of the CJS, such as the prosecution
of youth in adult courts, lengthy prison sentences, and lack of reha-
bilitative programming for prisoners.109
Though programs in this model may implicate some of the
rights of the accused, since they frequently take place pre-charge
or post-conviction, they do not implicate the full array of rights
required during a pending criminal case. Additionally, as programs
within this model view the CJS as the primary mechanism for jus-
tice, RJ programs in this model tend to be more focused on restor-
ing human connections than providing a substitute for the CJS.
Though the proximity to the CJS may impact the values of RJ pro-
grams in this model, these programs do not allege that they are
diverting State power and tend to acknowledge the extent to which
they are constrained by it.110 The primary concerns with this model
are net-widening and the inability of this model to address the
larger process of criminalization, which brings people to the atten-
tion of the CJS, and thus this hybrid model, in the first place.
A. Impact on Restorative Justice Values
The issues around voluntariness and power-sharing in the
court-based model are not as pronounced in the quasi-court-based
ojjdp/184738.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FEN-D46H ] (“The models differ in point of
referral and in structural relationship to formal court and correctional systems. The
models also differ in eligibility, which ranges from minor first offenders to quite seri-
ous repeat offenders (in the case of circle sentencing).”).
108 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 62, at 155-56 (“[I]t may be important to think of restor-
ative justice in terms of avoiding harm more than in terms of doing good. . . . Hence
the most important ways restorative justice may be able to reduce social injustice in-
volve reducing the impact of imprisonment as a cause of the unequal burdens of
unemployment, debt with extortionate interest burdens, suicide, rape, AIDS, hepatitis
C, and . . . multiple-drug-resistant tuberculosis . . . .”).
109 See, e.g., ZEHR WITH GOHAR, supra note 20, at 54 (describing alternative and di-
versionary programs that “aim to divert cases from, or provide an alternative to, some
part of the criminal justice process or sentence”).
110 See, e.g., id. at 24 (discussing the relationship between restorative justice and the
state).
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model. In this model, there is no assumption of voluntariness be-
cause the process itself is designed to mitigate the effects of the CJS
and to soften its impact on the accused.111 The extent to which
power can be shared in this model varies, particularly where some
participants are incarcerated and others are at liberty. However, as
there are typically not criminal charges hanging over anyone’s
head in this model, participants are more able to engage in a pro-
cess that fosters human connection.
B. Limits of Quasi-court-based Model
In pre-charge diversion programs, there are concerns about
net-widening. Net-widening refers to processes that widen the net
of State social control and result in a greater number of people
being controlled by the CJS.112 In this model, police may refer peo-
ple suspected of committing crime to a restorative process, rather
than pursue criminal charges.113 This allows police to exercise dis-
cretion about who is referred to these alternatives, and it runs the
risk of involving more people in the system in situations where au-
thorities previously may not have pursued any action. These pro-
grams usually require an admission of responsibility, compelling
the alleged offender to admit guilt and accept any consequences
imposed, without the advice of counsel, which raises due process
concerns.
Programs in this model identify potential participants based
on their position in the CJS. Though programs in this model may
not need to rely on permission from the court to engage in RJ, the
scope of this model is limited by the policies of criminalization
which disproportionately bring people from marginalized commu-
nities into the CJS.114
111 Id. at 53-55 (describing the purposes behind different models of restorative
justice).
112 Matthew C. Leone, Net Widening, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
1087, 1087-88 (David Levinson ed., 2002). In RJ in particular, net-widening may occur
by “dragging into the justice system people or behaviours that would otherwise be left
alone on the grounds that the system has something beneficial to offer them.” CUN-
NEEN & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 45.
113 See, e.g., Bruce P. Archibald, Let My People Go: Human Capital Investment and Com-
munity Capacity Building Via Meta/Regulation in A Deliberative Democracy—-A Modest Con-
tribution for Criminal Law and Restorative Justice, 16 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 39




114 See generally THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITY IN THE CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A MANUAL FOR PRACTITIONERS AND POLICYMAKERS 1 (2d. ed. 2008),
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IV. COMMUNITY-BASED RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
In the community-based model, RJ is a free-standing paradigm
for seeking justice, distinct from the CJS. In this model, the power
to engage in restorative justice is inherent in humankind, and
there is no need to seek or get permission from the State to ad-
dress and resolve matters between people. When a circle is con-
vened, power is shared equally among participants and the
facilitator. The justice that comes forth is a shared justice based on
the emergent wisdom of those who participate in the process. In
community-based RJ, the ideal outcome is the profound under-
standing that crime and other harms occur as a result of the “us
versus them” binary attitude that reflects a lack of human connec-
tion. As a manifestation of community dynamics, the responsibility
of addressing conflict likewise rests with communities themselves.
Community-based RJ programs can be based in schools, work-
places, neighborhoods, places of worship, or any other place
outside the purview of the CJS. Schools are an increasingly popular
location for community-based RJ, as educators seek methods to ad-
dress conflict beyond suspension and there is some established
sense of community.115
A. Location of Power and Relationship to the State
The community-based model can be framed as returning con-
flicts to the communities that they impact.116 However, a frequent
critique of RJ is that it relies on a notion of community that is now
obsolete. Critics argue that prior to the State monopoly on crime,
communities that relied on practices that would now be termed
restorative justice were small and tightknit. The realities of post-
http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Reducing-Racial-
Disparity-in-the-Criminal-Justice-System-A-Manual-for-Practitioners-and-Policymakers
.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4YW-9SB6]; Jeremy Prichard, Net-Widening and the Diversion
of Young People from Court: A Longitudinal Analysis with Implications for Restorative Justice,
43 AUSTRALIAN & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 112, 114 (2010) (describing negative externali-
ties like increased police power).
115 See, e.g., JESSICA ASHLEY & KIMBERLY BURKE, ILL. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. AUTH.,
IMPLEMENTING RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: A GUIDE FOR SCHOOLS (2009),https://www.scc
gov.org/sites/pdo/ppw/SESAP/Documents/SCHOOL%20RJP%20GUIDEBOOOK
.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XQC-8UHZ]; Susan Dominus, An Effective but Exhausting Al-
ternative to High-School Suspension, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.ny-
times.com/2016/09/11/magazine/an-effective-ut-exhausting-alternative-to-high-
school-suspensions.html [https://perma.cc/7R36-L2B3]; Eric Westervelt, An Alterna-
tive to Suspension and Expulsion: ‘Circle Up!’, NPR (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.npr.org/
sections/ed/2014/12/17/347383068/an-alternative-to-suspension-and-expulsion-cir-
cle-up [https://perma.cc/XV2N-2JT8].
116 Nils Christie, Conflicts as Property, 17 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 6 (1977).
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industrialization have rendered communities segregated and dif-
fuse. Typically, we know other people as roles rather than as full
human beings. Where our relationships with people are less com-
prehensive, we accept the notion that only trained experts are
qualified to evaluate someone’s individual competence.117 This has
resulted in the surrender of our shared right to conflict. We have
been willing to outsource our complaints to professionals, dealing
at arm’s length with those involved in a conflict, where prosecutors
label the harm and judges passively pronounce the norms.118
Though contemporary communities may be more diffuse than
in years past, returning conflicts to communities can be a source of
revitalization for communities where the connections among peo-
ple are weakened or absent. In this way, community-based RJ is a
recursive process that relies on communities to address conflict
and strengthens community ties in the process.119 In some in-
stances, a community may exist prior to the commencement of an
RJ process; in others, a community may converge and develop dur-
ing the process.
B. Limits of a Community-based Model
While RJ provides broader opportunities for engagement in
terms of participants and types of conflicts, its reach is not limitless.
Conflicts which are in the process of being adjudicated in the crim-
inal justice system will likely be outside the reach of an RJ interven-
tion, where it would implicate the accused’s Constitutional rights.
While this may appear to exclude many eligible conflicts from
the purview of community-based RJ, it is important to remember
that the CJS is also constrained in the cases it prosecutes. Many
crimes go unreported, and many reported crimes go unsolved.120
The offender-focus of the CJS means that it cannot deliver its ver-
sion of justice as punishment where an offender is unknown or
unidentified. A victim of crime has no right to petition the state for
restitution.121 In the community-based model, the victim could
convene a circle to address the harms they have encountered and
117 Id. at 5.
118 Maggie T. Grace, Criminal Alternative Dispute Resolution: Restoring Justice, Respecting
Responsibility, and Renewing Public Norms, 34 VT. L. REV. 563, 568 (2010).
119 Christie, supra note 116, at 5.
120 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 62, at 138.
121 The Availability of Crime Victims’ Rights Under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act
of 2004, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 6 n.5 (2010) (“[R]estitution, unlike many of the other rights
provided in section 3771(a), necessarily depends on the existence of a predicate con-
viction . . . .”)
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seek community support, though the perpetrator may be un-
known. While a restorative process may be more resonant where all
of the relevant stakeholders are present, it is not essential.
The primary limits of this model are internal. People are ac-
customed to handing conflicts over to professionals to resolve on
their behalf.122 Engaging in RJ requires time and a willingness to
listen to others and to speak honestly about difficult topics. As par-
ticipation is strictly voluntary, there must be people willing to par-
ticipate in a community-based model for it to thrive. Some have
suggested that RJ remains limited because people want retribution,
they want to see offenders punished.123 While this may be the case,
people are not as punitive as we often think. The general public is
more likely to support harsher penalties in the abstract, but not
when applied to specific facts, and they are less punitive than
judges and prosecutors.124 Additionally, it is crucial to remember
that punishment itself is “counterviolence, a variant of the violence
that required corrective action in the first place . . . .”125 By perpet-
uating this cycle:
We become a variant of the person who subdues other face-to-
face; we share in the destruction of life by chiseling away at the
foundations of the kind of community we say we desire. The
only difference is that we do not get to see clearly who or what
we have become and what kind of community we are in fact
creating because the justifications that vengeance and retribu-
tion offer us sedate our consciousness.126
Community-based RJ creates the potential to build commu-
nity, to seek constructive solutions to conflict, and to challenge op-
pressive societal structures.127 By developing a model that operates
outside the auspices of the CJS, the decision-making power of the
community is not confined to the legal issue identified by the
courts. Though RJ cannot transform the criminal justice system
from within, the development of a robust community-based alter-
native has the potential to transform how we approach justice as a
society. If individuals in conflict could request an independent RJ
122 Christie, supra note 116, at 9; see also Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of
Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423,
426 (2007) (noting the common “perception that defendants who represent them-
selves are foolish at best and mentally ill at worst”).
123 ANNALISE ACORN, COMPULSORY COMPASSION: A CRITIQUE OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
51 (2004).
124 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 62, at 148.
125 SULLIVAN & TIFFT, supra note 10, at 5.
126 Id. at 9.
127 Reimund, supra note 27, at 2.
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process rather than rely on police and prosecutors to address the
issue, reliance on the criminal justice system may decrease.128 We
can only discover the full potential of RJ as an alternate paradigm
for justice by collectively investing in it.
V. CONCLUSION
For restorative justice to take root and flourish as an alterna-
tive paradigm for justice, it must be community-based and distinct
from the criminal justice system. Though programs in the quasi-
court model may provide some measure of relief from the conse-
quences of CJS involvement, RJ is not designed to transform the
criminal justice system. Though advocates for merging the two par-
adigms argue that restorative justice can improve the criminal sys-
tem, it stands little chance of fundamentally changing the way
society deals with crime within the power dynamics of the CJS.
Rather than reforming the criminal justice system, attempts to
“soften” the inherent nature of the adversarial system by imple-
menting RJ within its structure actually function to expand the
powers of the State. If restorative justice is to transform how society
responds to crime, it must be on its own terms, as an alternate path
to justice.
128 Reimund, supra note 17, at 671.
